Menaced by foreign foes, facing mutiny at home: how long before Iran goes nuclear? | Simon Tisdall

Choices, choices. In life, there’s always a choice, or so that complacent saying goes. It didn’t really hold true for the people of Syria, bound and gagged by tyranny for half a century. Yet finally, after infinite pain, they chose freedom. Now the Middle East spotlight shifts to other victims of state oppression. Who’s next for revolution? Step forward, Iran.

A sudden collapse of the hardline theocratic regime in power since the Shah’s overthrow in 1979 is unlikely. True or false? Surprises happen, as all Syria knows. How Iran navigates the changing post-Assad landscape is fiercely debated in Tehran. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and senior mullahs face fateful decisions about the country’s path.

Let’s call it Ali’s choice: intensify internal repression, defy the west and rapidly acquire nuclear weapons to head off possible US-backed Israeli attacks and attempted regime change; or reverse course, embrace reform, rein in regional ambitions, make nice with the Americans – and, in doing so, reduce the chances of domestic insurrection.

This choice has existed, hypothetically, since Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s new-minted Islamic republic, committed to Israel’s destruction and sworn foe of the Great Satan, launched a covert nuclear programme in the 1980s. It has grown inescapably real this year, after Iran’s forward defence forces and allies were routed in Lebanon, Syria and Gaza.

Israel’s bellicose leader, Benjamin Netanyahu, has his tail up. Hoping to reshape the Middle East to his advantage, he has turned the region into a free-fire zone for Israeli forces. US president-elect Donald Trump has his back, or at least Netanyahu believes he does. And he has always defined Iran as the ultimate threat that must be dealt with, sooner or later.

“Sooner” may come soon: 2024’s military confrontations have normalised direct Israel-Iran conflict. Asked about war with Iran, Trump says: “Anything can happen.”

“The air force is already preparing for the next great task, which may receive a tailwind from the new resident of the White House,” a senior Israeli military official told a recent briefing, as reported by Haaretz. “New plans to attack nuclear facilities in Iran are being made under much more favourable conditions than in the past. There are more opportunities.”

Such public threats may be bluff – but Khamenei cannot be sure. Does he regard nuclear weapons as the best, last way to ensure regime survival?

This month’s revelation by UN inspectors of a “dramatic acceleration” in illicit Iranian production of near weapons-grade uranium suggests he might. In response, the UK, France and Germany last week threatened to “snap back” the full range of sanctions lifted after the 2015 Iran nuclear deal.

Trump wrecked that deal – yet recently expressed interest in resuming talks. Iran insists it wants a diplomatic solution and says claims of nuclear non-compliance are “baseless”. Trump may restrain Netanyahu rather than risk another war – but then again, he may not.

It’s an existential choice. Either Iran copies North Korea, whose open pursuit of nuclear weapons has brought international ostracism and economic devastation. Or it emulates Ukraine, which surrendered its nukes in 1994 in return for security guarantees and threw in its lot with the west. Some in Kyiv bitterly regret that decision, believing Russia would not have invaded had Ukraine been nuclear-armed.

Seen this way, the choice facing Iran is fundamental, broadly affecting its identity as a religious autocracy and future place in the world. Khamenei, 85, may try to fudge the issue, but cannot do so indefinitely.

When costly foreign wars and humiliating military setbacks are coupled with the regime’s domestic unpopularity, democratic illegitimacy, economic failures, violent repression and a looming, post-Khamenei transition, renewed status quo-shattering upheavals begin to look like a distinct possibility.

“Numerous civil unrest indices have ranked Iran among the least stable governments in the world,” analyst Karim Sadjadpour noted. “In the past 15 years alone, Iran has experienced three major national uprisings – in 2009, 2019 and 2022 – that brought millions of citizens into the streets.” The elimination of independent power centres and the brutish loyalty of security forces have so far shielded the regime from Syrian-style coups, he wrote.

This may change. Iran’s elites, stunned by Assad’s fall, wonder if a similar fate awaits them. “Nobody could believe this,” said foreign minister Abbas Araghchi, betraying a comical lack of imagination. Rising food costs, youth unemployment, anger over a spate of executions and human rights abuses, official corruption, power cuts and prospective fuel price increases are undetonated cluster bombs of popular discontent.

Iran’s reform-minded president, Masoud Pezeshkian, was so fearful of mass protests against a draconian new “chastity” law toughening hijab rules for women that he persuaded the national security council to suspend it last week. The 2022 death in custody of Mahsa Amini, a young woman accused of violating misogynistic dress codes, sparked regime-shaking demonstrations.

“Iran’s leaders… believe Iran could be next in line after Syria, not only as a target for foreign bombardment but as a locus of a civil coup that would draw its strength from the success of the rebels in Syria,” wrote Israeli commentator Zvi Bar’el.

Antony Blinken, US secretary of state, offered some free advice last week. Iran is at a turning point, he suggested. “One choice it could make and should make is to focus on trying to build a better, more successful country that delivers for its people… and to stop getting involved in adventures or misadventures throughout the region.”

Sounds sensible – but Khamenei is not listening. As long as he’s in charge, Iran will continue to make wrong choices, and internal and external pressure on the regime will continue to rise.

How ironic, and liberating, if the old tyrant’s myopic, mulish obstinacy were to spark a second Iranian revolution.